Books

HOW TO RUN A WAR.

December 1936 Wayne E. Stevens
Books
HOW TO RUN A WAR.
December 1936 Wayne E. Stevens

By Professor Bruce Winton Knight. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 243 pages. $2.00.

This is not only a timely volume but one that is also unusually interesting and novel in its approach. With the memory of the Great War still fresh, and looking out upon a world filled with ominous signs of new conflicts, Professor Knight shares the opinion of all rational persons that war, as a method of settling any question of policy, is wasteful, brutalizing, and stupid. In order to make its absurdity more, obvious, however, he assumes for the sake of argument that since war has played so important a role in the past, and inasmuch as a large proportion of our energy is at the present time devoted to preparing for future conflicts, it might be illuminating to take the position that war is a desirable thing, examine how it can be conducted most effectively, and see where this line of reasoning takes us. Hence the irony which is implied in the title of the book, and which is the keynote of its contents. While the approach is consciously ironical, the author has been wise enough not to stress this note too much. With less skillful handling the irony might have lost its effectiveness, but this danger has been cleverly avoided. The fact is that a large part of the book consists of a straightforward and decidedly informing exposition of what war has meant to the world. Many of the examples cited by way of illustration are naturally drawn from the experience of the World War. Professor Knight's analysis is based upon wide reading and study and the cold-blooded objectivity, which appears to be the real occasion for the ironical approach, is devastating. Almost every phase of warfare is dealt with—the causes of conflicts, preparedness, propaganda, tactics, economic mobilization, peace settlements, and ultimate costs. Of especial interest is the portion of the volume devoted to the many economic adjustments necessitated by modern warfare. The chapters dealing with war debts and the problem of ultimate costs constitute an excellent treatmentofan exceedingly complicated subject.

The author's tone and style remind one at times of Walter Millis, in his Road toWar. Mr. Millis, however, occasionally annoys the reader by constantly insisting upon the particular stupidity of the United States in allowing itself to be drawn into the World War. Professor Knight, on the other hand, directs his satire against war itself and not primarily against any nation or group. His real thesis—not the one which he assumes for purposes of argument—is unanswerable. While the volume is extremely well written, and enlivened here and there with touches of subtle humor, its greatest value consists in the amazing amount of information contained between its two covers in regard to war as an institution. The reading of this volume leads one to express the hope that Professor Knight may extend still further his researches in this neglected field.