THE COMMAND OF THE HOWE BROTHERS DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

By Troyer Steele Anderson '22. Oxford University Press, New York and London, 1936.

Notwithstanding the countless books which have been written concerning the American Revolution it is surprising that so little attention has been given to the higher strategy of the military operations of the war, and this is especially true as regards the British side of the picture. There was no lack of acrimonious controversy surrounding the British conduct of the war at the time, occasioned by a desire either to fix or to evade responsibility for defeat. Sir William Howe, Sir Henry Clinton, and Lord Cornwallis were the storm centers of discussion and their differences have become notorious. Various superficial explanations have been advanced to actount for the dismal failure of Howe's efforts to put down the rebellion, one of the most common being to the effect that he secretly sympathized with the Americans and hoped, by avoiding a too vigorous campaign against them, to pave the way for reconciliation. Support for this view seemed to be afforded by the fact that Sir William, along with his brother Lord Richard, the admiral, who was appointed to the naval command in America, bore commissions empowering them to negotiate for peace.

In this volume, Professor Anderson has undertaken a thoroughgoing study of the command of the two brothers in their respective military and naval spheres, in an effort to discover the nature of the powers which they exercised, the principles underlying their strategy, the character of their leadership, and the real reasons for their failure. The results of his investigation constitute the most authentic treatment of the British high command during the years 1776 and 1777 which has yet appeared.

The early chapters deal with the foundations of British military policy during the Revolution, and are followed by a discussion of the operations around Boston, in which General Howe played a prominent part. The main body of the volume is devoted to an analysis of Howe's campaigns in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania in 1776 and 1777, and to a study of the activities of the brothers as peace commissioners. In conclusion, there is a discussion of the reasons for British failure, which the author attributes, not to lack of sincerity in Howe's efforts, but to the difficulties inherent in his task, the inadequacy of the means at his disposal, and to the fact that his leadership was dominated by certain "routine ideas." Professor Anderson goes far beyond the conventional methods of military historians and endeavors to penetrate the psychology of the British leaders, as revealed by contemporary documents. He refuses to accept without question the conventional explanations of British failure and formulates and examines many alternative hypotheses suggested by the evidence.

An outstanding feature of the volume consists in its exceedingly wide use of new documentary material and scholars interested in this field will turn eagerly to the bibliographical essay which is a distinct contribution to the literature of the American Revolution. Among the materials examined, especial mention should be made of the papers of Sir Henry Clinton and Lord George Germain, recently acquired by the William L. Clements Library at Ann Arbor, Michigan. The vast collections in the Public Record Office in London and in other British repositories have also been carefully examined. It is probable that this volume will mark the beginning of a new trend in the study of the American Revolution and in conclusion, one cannot refrain from expressing the hope that Professor Anderson may himself see fit to apply his original method to the study of the latter phase of the Revolutionary conflict, centering, on the British side, around the personalities of Sir Henry Clinton and Lord Cornwallis.