Courting Catastrophe
ENERGY AND SECURITY: A Report of Harvard's Energy and Security Research Project Edited by David Deese '70 and Joseph Nye Bollinger, 1980. 489 pp. $14.95
This study documents in extensive detail the growing vulnerability of the free industrialized nations to the possible interruption of their supply of OPEC oil, and the enormous economic leverage the OPEC nations have over Free-World policies. The Persian Gulf region, which supplies 35 per cent of U.S. oil imports and a greater proportion of those of Western Europe and Japan, has shown an alarming degree of political instability in which our security is vulnerable to sudden and whimsical policy shifts, war, revolution, civil strife, and sabotage.
The Harvard report sees no early relief from the severe problems, and it gives readers little faith in the ability of the consuming nations to take the actions necessary to avoid economic calamity in the event of supply interruption. It notes that U.S. policies have exacerbated the problem since 1959, when Middle East oil was cheap and secure, when we imposed import restrictions that caused the rapid depletion of our domestic energy reserves, sowing thereby in the supplying nations the discontent that culminated in their nationalization of producing facilities. When the British gave up their military domination of the Persian Gulf region in 1965, instead of taking their place we armed the Shah of Iran as our surrogate, then failed to support him. When prices started to go up we slapped on price controls which encouraged expansion of energy use, stimulated the demand for large automobiles, suppressed U.S. production and exploration, and correspondingly increased oil imports.
Consuming nations face major problems individually and collectively, with Japan in the worst position. Renewable sources offer little potential relief. Nuclear power, a secure and non-polluting source, has been deterred by opposition in all nations except the Soviet Union and France, which have all-out nuclear building programs, and to a lesser degree in Great Britain and Japan, where nuclear building programs go forward.
The Soviets have large reserves of natural gas and are selling increasing amounts of it to Western Europe nations, especially West Germany. They are negotiating for European financing of a large pipeline that will greatly increase Western dependence. The Soviets also have large oil reserves, but their inadequate technology has not been capable of developing them. Since the U.S. has withdrawn all technological aid, the Soviet Union has turned to France for the necessary aid and equipment and has also made radical changes in its traditional planning and control to improve its economic productivity. Though the U.S. is potentially in better shape than its Free-World partners, with its large coal deposits, good gas reserves, secondary sources, and developable tars shales, the study points out that we cannot solve our problems unilaterally while our partners remain vulnerable. Meanwhile these writers see the developing countries being whipsawed by increasing costs and growing demand for available energy.
Military options are discussed, with particular concern for the defense of the Persian Gulf against a Soviet takeover. This reviewer, being convinced that the avoidance of nuclear war is the ultimate priority, takes a dim view of the prospect of any military defense of the region because of the almost certain escalation of such a conflict into a nuclear catastrophe. Even more certainly, any sort of conventional warfare conducted in the area would quickly result in the destruction of the highly vulnerable oil production and shipping facilities themselves, rendering the entire effort and risk self-defeating. The policy most clearly supported by the study is that the U.S. should help the Soviet Union in every possible way to develop its own oil reserves so that it will not be placed in competition with the West for the resources of the Persian Gulf.
The study concludes with a chapter recommending strategies for the consumer nations designed to avoid economic calamity in the event of energy-supply interruptions. It strongly urges the development of large strategic reserves, while noting that we have barely made a start in carrying out our initially ambitious plans for reserve oil storage. It emphasizes the importance of international cooperation and sharing, something that has not been achieved in past crises. And it sees the need for quick and decisive allocation of scarce reserves to optimum economic needs, but remarks that political needs have dominated our past efforts at allocation. The prospect is not a very cheerful one.
After a long career as an engineer in theautomotive industry, Frederick Hooven is nowan adjunct professor at the Thayer School.
