HANOVER BROWSING

IN THE FIRST article of "Hanover Browsing" I referred to Lippmann's Prefaceto Morals and its analysis of how "the acids of modernity" have affected the traditional ethical and religious beliefs of Western civilization. The most important of these acids of modernity was science. No student of modern culture can fail to see the centrality of science in that culture. In a real sense it can be said that Occidental civilization has been sired by science and technology. Together they constitute the most revolutionary factors in the contemporary world. But we are only dimly aware of their revolutionary nature. If there is a problem of science it is due partly to the unsettling effects of science on our inherited body of ideas and beliefs. There is today a noticeable lack of harmony in the moral and spiritual views of men. The main reason for this is the uncoordinated body of knowledge which the various sciences, natural, biological and social, have accumulated during the last few centuries. How to synthesize these growing stores of knowledge is a very difficult philosophical problem.

But pure science is not the only disturbing influence in the modern world. An equally important factor making for vast cultural changes is technology. Some would assign a greater influence to this than to pure science. Analysis, however, seems to reveal technology as largely dependent on the applications of pure science to practical tasks. Be the relationship between the two what it may, one cannot but see how technology is affecting the world. The socalled problem of "Man and Technics," to use Spengler's phrase, is an outgrowth of this situation. The doubts and fears so current today with regard to science and technology arise largely out of our imperfect control over their effects on our basic institutions and ways of living. In this connection I am reminded of a story told by Thomas Huxley. He had an important breakfast engagement, but, having slept late, he rushed out and summoned a cab, and said to the driver as he jumped in: "Now drive as fast as you can, I am in a great hurry." The driver whipped up his horse and set off at a wild gallop until Huxley was almost jerked off his seat. At this he shouted to the driver: "My good friend, do you know where I want to go?" "No, yer honner," "but I am driving fast."

That sums up the situation as we find it today. Technology is the driver. But neither driver nor driven has a clear notion of the destination. But we axe going fast. It is the possibilities inherent in this situation that E. W. Hobson had in mind in his Gifford Lectures when he said that "the results of natural science . . . have furnished us with the mechanical means of securing an indefinite improvement in the welfare of mankind. . . . They have also provided our civilization with the material means of committing suicide."

In this month's article I shall not write on this aspect of science. How the discoveries of science and the inventions of technology have made it possible for society to possess such tremendous power for weal or woe is told interestingly in Behemoth by Hodgins and Magoun. Another phase of the question is presented ably in Berry's Stuff.

IN THIS ISSUE I want to suggest a number of recent books dealing with contemporary developments and their philosophical repercussions. My browsing in this field has been spread out over the winter months. I vary my reading for relief's sake—light and heavy reading and easy and difficult books in a sort of browsing succession. The books I have found most helpful on science and philosophy this academic year are the following: 1. Heredity and Variation. Dunn.

2. Matter and Energy. Bazzoni. These two are about the best in the interesting series of small books issued by The University Society, N. Y. The series is called The Highlights of Modern Knowledge. The two mentioned have a lucidity in exposition which will appeal to the average, unspecialized reader. Some of the others, in the series are not quite as good. Very readable volumes discussing the newer additions to modern physics and biology are the following. They are listed roughly according to difficulty. The easierbooks come first in the list.

1. The New Conceptions of Matter. C. G. Darwin. 1931. This calls for very little previous knowledge of physics. It is easy to read.

2. The New World of Physical Discovery. Floyd L. Darrow. 1932. Journalistic and popular in aim and treatment. It has a tendency to exaggerate the "revolutionary" changes in modern physics. This is a common fault with popular writers on science. They want to dramatize the story too much.

3. Atom and, Cosmos. Hans Reichenbach. 1933. This is a translation from the German. It gives a fairly clear account of recent changes in physics and how they have affected the physicist's conceptions of space, time, light, radiation, matter, mass, energy, causation. The last two chapters are philosophical in their nature. They discuss causality and probability and the Picture and Reality. It is interesting to compare them with the philosophical chapters in the books of Eddington and Jeans and Planck.

4. The Universe Around Us. Sir James Jeans. The chapter on "Beginnings and Endings" is of interest to the philosopher.

5. The Mysterious Universe. Also by Jeans. This is a popular treatment. The chapter entitled "Into the Deep Waters" should be contrasted with Eddington and Planck and Reichenbach. Here Jeans argues against determinism and suggests that the world is pure thought—the thought of a mathematical thinker.

6. The Nature of the Physical World. A. S. Eddington. A more satisfying book than either of the books of Jeans. The latter part of the volume is provocative to the logical minded. His use of Heisenberg's "principle of indeterminacy" is suggestive but open to serious criticisms. His statements as a philosopher interested in religious mysticism are not as guarded or logical as those growing out of his work as a scientist.

7. Science and the Unseen World. Also by Eddington. This is the much discussed Swarthmore Lecture. Here the religious mystic is uppermost.

8. The Universe in the Light of ModernPhysics. Max Planck. A lucid treatment by Germany's leading theoretical physicist. 9. Where Is Science Going. Also by Max Planck. 1932. Planck the philosopher speaks in this interesting volume. The discussion of Causation and Free Will and allied topics as well as the criticisms of Positivism by the discoverer of the Quantum Theory are a valuable corrective to the ideas of Eddington and Jeans on the same subjects. The reader interested in the philosophical implications of relativity and the Quantum theory will find this volume illuminating. In my opinion his arguments would be strengthened by the elimination of the Kantian elements. Einstein writes the Prologue to this book, and he also is in agreement with Planck and not with Eddington and Jeans on the question of dynamical versus statistical causation.

10. The Universe of Science. H. Levy. 1932. Another scientist critical of the philosophizing of Eddington and Jeans. It embodies the point of view of the experimental physicist more so than that of the mathematical physicist. It contains some keen criticisms of the latter.

11. The Case Against Einstein. Arthur Lynch. 1933. A thorough-going criticism of the relativity theory of Einstein. He attacks it from a three-fold point of viewpsychological, physical and mathematical, and logical. He overshoots his mark in places. He accuses him of verbalism and of attempting to give objective reality to statements of mathematical relations. It contains some good criticisms.

12. The Mechanism of Creative Evolution. C. C. Hurst. 1932. A clear presentation of recent developments in Genetics. It is amusing to find the author referring to the "revolution" that has taken place even in this field. We are certainly living in a revolutionary age.

13. The Scientific Basis of Evolution. T. Hunt Morgan. 1932. If mechanism is in disrepute in physics, as the libertarian group of physicists claim, it shows signs of aggressiveness in this work of Morgan. He also makes some pointed criticisms of some modern metaphysical physicists. The emphasis on the experimental technique of modern geneticists in contrast with the observational and descriptive method of Darwin is stressed.

FOR THE READER interested in the philosophy o£ science there are pertinent chapters in most of the books recommended. However, it is we'll worth while to pursue the subject beyond the limits of these chapters. And for that purpose some of the best of the recent attempts to formulate a system of philosophy in harmony with the significant reconstructions in physics and biology, are the following:

1. Process and Reality. A. N. Whitehead. 1929. This is a difficult book to read. This is due not so much to its matter as to the style and terms and method of the author. Having followed the development of Whitehead's philosophy of nature and of values for a few years now, I found this systematic exposition of it rather stimulating. One has to get used to Whitehead to follow easily the development of his thought. He is well worth that effort. In general I view his system with a certain amount of sympathy. To me he is a suggestive thinker.

2. Science and First Principles. F. S. C.' Northrup. 1931. The historical sections and references of this work are helpful. It has some elements in common with Whitehead.

3. The Natural Sciences. Bernhard Bavink. Translated from the German by H. S. Hatfield. The Century Co. 1932. $7.00. This is the most ambitious and comprehensive discussion of recent developments in the natural, biological, and social sciences that I know of in the compass of one volume. It takes careful reading and thought. But ploughing through it will amply repay the patient reader. I found much in it of real value. Both scientists and philosophers may peruse the book with advantage. It is a very commendable achievement. It has some weaknesses and mistakes—particularly in the last half of the book. His critical comments on positivism and conventionalism (or fictionism) are penetrating. The chapter on "The Process of Knowledge in Physics" is clarifying. The notes at the end of the volume are especially informative.

Inasmuch as the general tendency of the philosophy of Eddington, Jeans, Planck, and certain of the other authors mentioned, lies in the direction of idealism, it would be appropriate to read some expressions of idealism in its modern forms. I can recommend these recently published volumes.

1. Contemporary Idealism in America. Edited by C. Barrett. Some of the separate contributions in this book are excellent, especially those of Bakewell, Urban, Hocking and Hoernle.

2. The Idealistic Argument in RecentBritish and American Philosophy. G. W. Cunningham. 1933. The expository section of this volume is very good. The critical part is also discriminating.

3. The Idealist View of Life. S. Radhakrishan. 1932. To those interested in religious philosophy of an idealistic nature this work can be recommended.

4.. Six Theories of Mind. C. W. Morris. 1932. I read this with pleasure and profit. The author submits the theories of mind of the most important schools of philosophy to critical analysis. It is a searching piece of work. The point of view of the author is not that of idealism but. of instrumentalism.

5. The Logic Of Science. Prof. Smart of Cornell. I liked some portions of this volume. It points out the essential differences between the phenomena studied respectively by physics, and biology, and history, and the social sciences. Each order of phenomena calls for a different logic and a different set of concepts and principles in harmony with itself. The analysis is good in so far as it goes. But for some reason or other the author does not do justice to its implications. He sees very clearly but he argues confusedly.

6. Perhaps I ought to conclude the list by recommending with reservations the popular book of Bertrand Russell on TheScientific Outlook. He also makes some pointed criticisms of Eddington and His own position is as sceptical as ever. Russell is a sort of Hume among modern philosophers. There is a large dose of scepticism in his philosophical make-up. His present book could, however, have been a much better contribution. Here and there it drops down to a pot-boiling level.

THE DIFFICULT thing in philosophy is to comprehend reality in its diverse forms and relationships. Particularistic views and insights blur one's understanding of the whole. It is no wonder that Plato exclaimed "Show me a man able to see both the one and the many in nature, and I will follow in his footsteps as though he were a god."

Considerations of space do not allow me to analyze the weaknesses of the philosophical positions of the books recommended in this month's list. There are a number of dubious elements and inferences in Eddington's use of the Heisenberg Principle of uncertainty or inderterminacy. Disguised verbalism, convictionism, ambiguous analogies, equivocation, looseness of language and even of logic detract from the cogency of his arguments. What he would not do in science, he is inclined to do over-much in philosophy. Not that I am opposed to many elements in his philosophy, for I am partly in sympathy with him on that score. But I like more rigor and guarded logic and searching analysis of basic assumptions than either Eddington or Jeans shows in his philosophizing.

Furthermore, there is nothing to be gained by constructing a philosophical superstructure on our present ignorance of small-scale physical processes. The gaps in our knowledge may be filled in any time. This applies with special force to the use made by certain modern thinkers of a principle having provisional validity within the small-scale world of the atom and the electron but inapplicable to the gross and large-scale of classical physics. It is a risky thing to build a system of philosophy on the basis of the contemporary results of science. Philosophies of evolution and indeterminacy are vitiated by their excessive contemporaneity.

One reason why religious-minded scientists do this is because of their justifiable objection to the mechanistic and materialistic philosophies built up on the rigid causal and deterministic science of the nineteenth century. They seek liberation from these naturalistic philosophies of the past, and, in their very eagerness to use any grain of assistance modern physics promises, they make the same dubious application of contemporary science as was done in their day by the materialists they denounce. They are' doing now what the rigid mechanists did in their generation. In my opinion that is a dangerous thing to do. We criticise the naturalists for the use made by them of the science of their age and we do in essentials the same thing with the science of our day.

THERE ARE passages in Eddington suggesting that he reserves his faith for the Unseen World and his scepticism for the world of Physics. On the other hand Russell's bias is to be sceptical of all worlds, and to have faith in none. He is a champion of doubt and scepticism. He is even sceptical of the unities science has discovered in nature. In his Scientific Outlook we catch him in as sceptical a mood as ever, for, he states "The most fundamental of my intellectual beliefs is that this (unity of the cosmos) is rubbish. I think the universe is all spots and jumps, without unity, without continuity, without coherence or orderliness, or any of the other properties that governesses love. Indeed, there is little but prejudice and habit to be said for the view that there is a world at all." This excessively sceptical deliverance of Russell is in line with his way of interpreting our knowledge of the universe as expressed by him in many of his previous books. He is at least consistent in his scepticism. Part of his difficulty arises out of his refusal to interpret the universe in the light of the hopes and fears of men. He thinks this refusal is demanded by the use of the scientific method in philosophy. And science should be the inspiration of philosophy. But science in its spirit and method and not in its results. The results are provisional in nature because as science expands the new results of tomorrow are bound to modify those of today. Accordingly it is the methods of science that are important for philosophy. And if philosophers will only follow these methods many of the dangers resulting from the misuse of the temporary results of science will be avoided, and the fate of philosophy will not be decided by every new generalization in science. Moreover the temptation of philosophy to generalize beyond present experience to things universally, or to make use of "scientific generalizations of a sweeping kind" as its basis and for its own purposes will be less real and harmful if the methods and not the results of science were adopted by philosophy. The logic of this line of reasoning accounts for Russell's refusal to regard the hopes, fears and ideals of men as significant clues to the meaning of the world.

Here, however, it looks as if Russell is inconsistent. To rule human hopes and values out of the proper province of philosophy is in itself a judgment of value, and one of some importance in its bearing on life. To declare that value has no place in philosophy and that it offers no clue to the understanding of the world is equivalent to the use of value in a negative sense. Value is used negatively in order to condemn its use positively. If we judge the universe to be such that value is not a key to its understanding, we are really passing a tremendously significant judgment of value on both the world and human values. The whole procedure of banishing values from our attempt to understand the world is therefore not only arbitrary but inherently inconsistent. The arbitrariness of the procedure is seen in the fact that moral and religious values are denied a standing in philosophy on the ground presumably that they conflict with logical or mathematical values. Logic and mathematics and the attempt to describe the world logically and mathematically contain within themselves a number of value-judgments which in any case are given adequate recognition in Russell's philosophy. We do not condemn this recognition unless it is gained by denying arbitrarily the legitimate claim of other values for an equal share of recognition.

Philosophers like Russell have a perfect right to carry their method as far as it will go. It is only in this way that we can realize the possibilities and perhaps the limitations of that method. Indeed, the attempt to construct both matter and mind that Russell tried to do in his books on OurKnowledge of the External World and Analysis of Mind and Philosophy is not only valuable from the physical and psychological point of view but also necessary for our understanding of the ultimate problems of philosophy. The only thing open to criticism in this procedure is its excessively logical character and its somewhat arbitrary selection of initial postulates and hypothetical general propositions.

Furthermore to rule out values from philosophy is essentially one-sided and unscientific. The hopes and fears and ideals of men are as much facts as logical relations and terms or the data of physics. They belong to the world as we know it even though they may not find a place in the world of neutral entities. And the facts of ethical and religious experience are also as much facts as the protons and electrons of physics. Whatever significance they may have in relation to the problem of the nature and meaning of ultimate reality they cannot be denied as facts. The moral and religious evaluations of men therefore demand equal consideration with the facts of the physical or the neutral order. At any rate to' bar them out of the sphere of philosophy is a procedure that is illogical and unjustifiable. For certain purposes it may be desirable to delimit philosophy in this manner, but in the end philosophy must take for its province the whole of experience.

We therefore take the side of Eddington, Jeans, Whitehead, Planck and Bavink in their insistence that a satisfying philosophy must concern itself with values as well as with physical facts. It must try to do justice to the values of morality, art and religion as well as to the relations and symbols of mathematics or the entities and patterns of physics and biology. How to do this is, however, a real difficulty. The difficulty is to avoid the danger of succumbing to an objectionable type of anthropomorphism. This danger is present in every attempt to use values as clues to the interpretation of reality. This is the case whether the attempt is made by instrumentalist or realist or idealist. If we apply terms like value, mind, will, intelligence, spirit to Reality as a whole, or to activities within the whole, we tend to become anthropomorphic in perhaps as pronounced a way as the plain religious man is apt to become when he pictures God as a sort of enlarged edition of men. Such terms are not flexible or dynamic enough to help us in any fruitful way to understand the relations existing between seemingly different types or modes of reality. They stand for certain kinds of unity and certain types of correlation with which we are familiar, but they only imperfectly hint at the kind of complex relations which may or may not characterize the processes of change on a cosmic scale. There are many possible forms of harmonious unities which our actual experiences may but faintly anticipate. To take our inadequate categories and apply them mechanically to larger unities is to forsake thought for fantasy. Similar dangers accompany attempts to apply the law of entropy or the principle of quantitative uncertainty to non-specific systems within which they have little specific meaning. The tendency to select type-phenomena valid within certain restricted fields and apply them to other parts or the whole of reality is ever-present in philosophy. The pattern or principle selected may be applicable to a specific part of reality, and it is legitimate to apply it to the part to which it belongs and within which it has meaning. The trouble comes in applying that which is related to a limited dimension as a principle of explanation to the whole. This is the basic weakness of philosophical materialism or naturalism with its application of mechanical patterns and concepts to the world as a whole, or idealism with its use of value or experience as a key to the interpretation of the universe. We do not denounce this tendency of modern philosophies of science altogether, for it is natural and perhaps inevitable. We refer to it in order to point out the danger of its illogical misuse. That such a danger is a very real one is clear to the critical reader of some of the books in this month's recommended list. When it comes to philosophy even cautious scientists are apt to become loose and uncritical in their statements. Note the statement of Jeans in The Mysterious Universe that "Heisenberg now makes it appear that nature abhors accuracy and precision above all things."

I would like to expand my criticisms of these modern philosophies of science, but I must keep in mind what Gertrude Stein adumbrated in her model short story:

"He said enough He said enough: Enough said. He said enough, He said enough: Enough said."