Third Panel Discussion

I THINK it is a first essential that this grand alliance define its objective. I do not agree that peace, enduring peace, is a sufficient objective. First of all, the lessons of history are against us when we talk about an enduring peace. There has been no such thing in all the years of recorded history. If we adopt this as an objective, when we are faced with an aggressive, strong Communist power we are in a sense doomed before we start. I think our proper objective is survival, mutual security. . . .

I think we must also recognize that we cannot, in a military sense, concert all our moves. There are bound to be occasions when each one of these three partners must have and will retain the right to the unilateral use of force. I do not agree that force is no longer an instrument of diplomacy. I think it must be and will be. We have seen the use of force at Suez and by the British in Oman. As we sit here today force is being employed against Communist guerrillas in Malaya. To me this is essential. We must retain the right and we cannot expect to concert the use of force in all such small situations.

Basically what we are talking about is concerting our military policies to provide a means for survival against two great threats. One is the all-out aggression by the Soviet bloc; by all-out I mean the unlimited use of all weapons, actual military aggression, the use of nuclear weapons or the Soviet ground armies. The other is the gradual creeping aggression of communism, the attack by Soviet Russia through encroachments in small nations, leading eventually, if continued, to a conquest of these uncommitted nations, which might doom us all.

How do we defend against these things? How do we concert our policies? The great differences between us are really who should do what and how. We have created a nuclear deterrent upon which NATO frankly depends. . . . There is some fear among our allies overseas that we will revert to essentially an isolationist strategy and defend Europe from the United States. This explains in large measure the desire of the British for development of the hydrogen bomb, the desire of the French for their own nuclear weapons in their own hands, and the desire of many of our other allies for similar protection. It seems to me these desires are justified. One of the things we can and should do in the future is to amend the Nuclear Energy Act and provide our NATO allies with tactical nuclear weapons. This is not so important militarily as it is politically and psychologically. Delivery capabilities count as much as nuclear weapons, and many of our small allies obviously do not have the capabilities of delivering these weapons against an enemy. But if they have them in their own hands and under their own control - and mark you, they will get them whether we give them to them or not - there will be, I think, a much greater feeling of solidarity and a much greater strength to the alliance.

Then to meet the second phase of the problem, the encroachments of communism all over the world, what is ob- viously and clearly needed is a fire-brigade force of conventional forces, preferably one capable of being air-lifted to any part of the world in a hurry. Neither Britain nor ourselves have this in sufficient measure today. Unfortunately both our countries have tended, I think, to concentrate too much on the nuclear deterrent at the expense of conventional forces. I think you saw this in the small recent fighting in Oman, when it took quite a long time for the British to transport even one battalion of troops to the scene. I should think that in the future there should be some way of concerting particularly Anglo-American and Canadian action in this field of providing conventional forces. If for instance the problem of Cyprus should ever be solved, and I think it is soluble, why should there not be a combined Anglo-American airborne force? Cyprus is in a central location in the Eastern Mediterranean, quite ideal as a geographical base for exercising influence, for providing a fire brigade for the whole Middle Eastern area. Why shouldn't there be a battalion of British airborne forces, a battalion of American airborne forces, perhaps under joint command, ready to put out a fire anywhere in the neighborhood?